VICKSBURG Chapter Eight

By the third week of December, 1862, anybody in Memphis, Tennessee who wanted to know knew for certain the Yankees were about to launch a major amphibious assault someplace: The logical spot being Vicksburg.  The 25,000 rookie bluecoats in camps around the city were being issued fresh equipment. Five thousand veterans had appeared suddenly from the front lines 90 miles to the south around Oxford, Mississippi. 

All free space on the six ironclads anchored in the river were jammed with ammunition and coal, and each were now towing barges stacked with more coal. Empty transports docked every day until they totaled sixty.  And Major General William Tecumseh Sherman had been in town for a week. Everywhere he appeared, things happened. And still the rebel spies almost missed the invasion.

The two Texas staff officers assigned to keep a lookout up river,  Majors Lee L. Daniel and E.P. Earnhearst, were spending Christmas Eve in a shack drinking and gambling over a card game called "Old Sledge."  According to Major Daniel just before 9:00pm a slave girl walked in and announced she heard a boat coming. "I hears it say, choo choo, pat, pat, pat". Stepping out onto the porch the two officers also heard faint sounds of a steam boat and paddle wheel. 

In the "dark, cloudy night, cold and drizzly"  the tipsy pair stumbled the 200 yards down to the river bank and within half an hour, according to Major Daniel, "...a monster turned the bend, two miles above us, and came slowly as if feeling the way.."....(When) the large black devil was abreast of us..." Daniel started to run back to the shack, but Earnhearst grabbed his arm and whispered, "Hello Major,  here comes another," The pair silently counted seven gunboats and fifty-nine transports "loaded with bluecoats"  passing them in the dark.

Major Daniel wrote,  "...as soon as we were satisfied the last one was by, I jumped on my little bay filly and fairly flew to the little telegraph office, three miles back in the woods." It was a private telegraph line, owned by a wealthy planter who lived 11 miles south of Lake Providence, Arkansas, but it was a direct connection to the tiny railroad terminal of DeSoto, just across the Mississippi river from Vicksburg.  Just after midnight he started tapping out the alarm.   

The operator on the De Soto Penninsula, 24 year old Phillip Hadley Fall was sleeping, but the constant tapping woke him after a few long moments. He responded, ‘Golly, old fellow, what’s up?’ And Major Daniel replied, "Great God, Phil, where have you been. I have been calling....the river is lined with boats, almost a hundred have just passed my lookout. Seven gunboats and fifty-nine transports chock full of men. God speed you, rush across and give the alarm.’  The young Fall replied, "God bless you, Lee. Bye, bye, we may never meet again."  It was not until an hour later that the Yankees landed at Milikens Bend, cut the planter's telegraph line and tore down a mile of the poles.  

Having scribbled the message down, Fall an to the docks, clambered aboard a rowboat, and headed across the half mile of cold brown water to the Vicksburg docks. "The Mississippi was very rough" but young Fall made the crossing and hurried to the Balfour mansion at the corner of Crawford and Cherry streets high on the hills of Vicksburg, where the cream of the military and society were attending a holiday ball. " Fall says, "I was muddy and woe begone as I passed through the dancers and they gave me a wide berth. 

When I stopped in front of General Smith, he scanned me critically and frowned with the exclamation, ‘Well sir, what do you want?’ I told him eighty-one gun boats and transports had passed Lake Providence and were still passing. He turned very pale, and in a loud voice exclaimed! ‘This ball is at an end; the enemy are coming down the river, all non-combatants must leave the city.’ 

The 43 year old Martin Luther Smith (above) had been a Brigadier General for a little over a month. A transplanted northerner, married to Georgia woman, he was more comfortable as an engineer than leading a charge.  He had designed the defenses of Vicksburg, placing every gun along it's river front. He was also a division  commander. And he had one major tactical advantage over General Sherman and Vice Admiral Porter. Smith knew that Grant was retreating from Oxford. He knew there was no longer pressure on the rebel right flank. Sherman did not. And Smith had a direct railroad connection between Jackson and Vicksburg, and was already being reinforced via that line, while Sherman had only the men in his transports.

First to arrive on Christmas day was 29 year old Confederate General Stephen Dill Lee (above) - no relation to Robert E. of Virginia - with 5,000 men who marched 15 miles from Vicksburg, along the River Road, which ran the crest of the Walnut Hills. 

Using his troops and slave labor, Lee set out trenches and earthen forts. The lakes and bayous already dictated just two narrow approaches for any attackers, but Lee set his men to constructing abatis - a sort of wooden barbed wire. - confining the attackers even more, into what would one day be called "kill zones". In the old army this North Carolina native had been a career artillerist, and Lee now confidently placed his few cannon to rake the only two logical approaches up the slope. Another 8,000 troops could now be rushed to Lee's support, assured there would be ample reinforcements from the now quiet Grenada front.

The 7 Federal gunboats broadcast the chosen landings sites by bombarding the Johnson plantation, destroying the main house and barns. Then the Federal troops wadded ashore, taking their time. Amphibious operations are always difficult, particularly if you have never done them before. It was not until nightfall on Sunday, 28 December that the 4 divisions were finally on reasonably dry land, with General Frederick Steele's division on the right, at the Johnson plantation, and General Morgan's men on the left , facing the "banks" of 80 foot wide Chickasaw Bayou, on the plantation owned by Mrs. Anne Lake.

Observed one of the Yankee officers, , "The day before had been bright and warm, but the morning of the assault dawned raw and cloudy, with signs of rain. The ground over which the advance was to be made was that in front of the two left Brigades of (53 year old Brigadier General George Washington ) Morgan's (above) Division...During the night of the 28th and the morning of the 29th, skirmishers had crept out and at some cost had examined the ground...Just in front, immediately at the edge of the wood, was a bayou (above)  filled with water too deep to be forded and flanked by steep banks...

Immediately beyond the first bayou lay a tract of rough, swampy ground perhaps fifty rods across, piled and strewn with fallen timber, the heavy swamp woods, having been cut down to impede approach and give range to the enemy's guns. Beyond the slashed timber and parallel with the first bayou lay a second and more difficult one. It was in fact a long pool and quagmire of varying width and unknown depth.... 

 "...A careful examination of the ground convinced General Morgan that any assault at that point must end in disastrous failure. The only chance of success had been lost by our three or four days of delay.... All this General Morgan and his brigade commanders saw...(and) request that General Sherman should come to the field. Together the two Generals rode up and down in front of the line, Morgan pointing out the difficulties of the advance ...and advised against what he and his officers considered a reckless and unavailing sacrifice of life. ...
"General Sherman (above), disappointed and morose, looked at the ground, and then turning his horse, rode back, without saying a word....This was about nine o'clock in the morning....(and ) left General Morgan in doubt whether the assault would be attempted or abandoned....But at noon an officer from Sherman's Staff came to Morgan....(to deliver Sherman's orders) I wish him to give the signal for the assault; that we will lose five thousand men in taking Vicksburg, and may as well lose them now.'  

Sometime around 8:00am that Monday morning, 29 December, General Morgan ordered his engineers to bridge the first bayou. That was when the man assigned the task, Major William Franklyn Patterson and his company (about 40 men) of Mechanics and Engineers, discovered that in the rush to launch the expedition a few crucial pieces of their pontoon bridges had been left on the Memphis dock. However, Patterson insisted he could jury rig a fix in 2 hours.

But finally, at about 11:00am, with the bridge still not completed, four four regiments -  54th Indiana, 22nd Kentucky, and 42nd and 16th Ohio)...waded across the chest deep Chickasaw Bayou. The men staggered up the steep bank, and then threaded their way through the abatis and managed to drive the rebel pickets from their forward rifle pits..." at the base of the Walnut Hills.. 

As private John Hugh Thomson,  of Company G  of the 16th Ohio explained afterward, "Our men fell by dozens. But on we went. I pressed on till I got to their second breastworks.... beside me, to my left, lay a young man with his brains blown out. To my right was one with his arm broke and another with his fingers shot off, and (Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Ksershiner) dropped down right behind me with his arm shot off. Poor man! I can see him running yet, carrying his arm along with him."

Corporal Theodore D. Wolbach, of Company E, of the 16th Ohio saw, "George Glick, of Company A had the upper part of his nose between the eyes carried away by a musket ball; a half inch closer would have taken the eyes....The commanding officers of the 16th Ohio and 22nd Kentucky, Kershner and Monroe, were both wounded, the former in the arm and the later in the head. Kershner was captured...

"...An exploding shell tore the flag of the 22d Kentucky into shreds. The color-bearer, a noble looking Hungarian commonly known as 'Nick,' frightened and bewildered, threw the staff away and would never afterward carry the colors....Lieutenant Ross, of Company G, was shot in the face...Jonathan Wright, of Company E, was struck on the side of the head by the leaden fuse plate of a shell. It broke the jaw-bone badly and embedded itself firmly in the side of the face,

"It was a mortifying spectacle," said Wolbach, " to see the exultant Confederates, marching our comrades as prisoners of war, over the distant hill toward Vicksburg...During the night of the 29th the 'tooting' of locomotives and the cheering of our enemy, assured us that they were getting reinforcements."

After the repulse Brigadier General George Morgan found General Sherman in Mrs. Lake's mansion, alone and pacing the floor. Morgan reported the failure of the attack, and to his credit Sherman did not demand further sacrifice,  The next morning, the 30th, found the 16th lifting their chilled and benumbed bodies from a muddy bivouac in an old cornfield. When we were in ranks, in column of Companies, the havoc of the fight was painfully visible. One Company, (K,) had only fifteen men present all told. Some of the Companies had no officers. 

Two days later a truce finally allowed the Federals to collect their dead.   Corporal Wolbach recorded that, "A long trench was shoveled out in an old cotton field about half a mile in our rear. Here, side by side in a long line, dead men of regiments from six western States were laid and the soft earth heaped over them. That night we received orders to quietly withdraw from our position and return to our boats. Everything was conducted so nicely that the rebels did not discover that we were gone until the next morning"

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Admiral Porter spent the next day looking for a new spot to try and gain the high ground. He thought he found it a few miles upstream, and on the last day of 1862, Sherman began to shift his men. But when 1863 began with a thick fog blanketing the river bottom, Sherman at last admitted defeat and called off the expedition. 

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Federal dead were over 200, with about a thousand wounded. The Confederate losses were 36 killed, 78 wounded, 3 deserted — total, 124.   In addition, the rebels were able to capture over 500 Federals, caught in a depression under the guns in front of the Confederate position.  On Friday, 2 January 1863 he returned to the Mississippi River, and informed Washington of his failure. By return telegram, General-in-Chief Hallack informed Sherman he and his men were now under the direct command of Major General John McClernand.  It seemed that Grant had lost his chance.

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- 30 -



 He had once remarked to a staff officer, “In war anything is better than indecision. We must decide. If I am wrong, we shall soon find out, and can do the other thing. But not to decide wastes both time and money, and may ruin everything"....


Hernando de Soto, perhaps near the spot where the few followers he had left dumped the weighted body of the jackass conquestador into the muddy waters in 1542.     

The ancestor of the Mississippi River has been flowing since the late Cretacous, 

70 million years ago during the Cretaceous. At that time a structural trough, known as the Mississippi Embayment became increasingly active. This trough extended from the Gulf up through Illinois, with an axis that largely followed the Mississippi River. Throughout the late Cretaceous and into the Tertiary, this trough became filled with sediments with sources in the Appalachian Mountains due to erosion and transportation, and from the Gulf of Mexico during periods of higher sea-level. Over time, these sediments were compacted and cemented, forming the rock units we see today.  Loess has several characteristic qualities that gave it a key role during the Vicksburg Campaign. These include its tendency to remain relatively stable when cut at 90 degree angles. It is also highly unstable when on a slope, which has led to many serious erosional issues both in and outside the park.

By the time the Oligocene came about, much of the inland sea that had formed in the embayment trough had filled with sediment. The shore of this inland finger of the Gulf was much closer to Vicksburg at this point, as the sea retreated south. It was during this time that rocks seen in outcrops in the park today were formed. These rock units make up the Vicksburg Group. The Vicksburg Group is important geologically because it records the last significant world-wide rise and fall of sea level.

Oligocene Epoch in the Paleogene Period to the Holocene in the Quaternary 



1876. On April 26 of that year, the Mississippi River suddenly changed courses, leaving Vicksburg high and dry. The river, by its own power succeeded in cutting across the Desoto Peninsula, something which the Union troops had failed to orchestrate 13 years prior.

We have all said cruel things, but when a general says them, people die. And before launching his assault on the heights above Chickasaw Bayou and the Walnut Hills Sherman said, "...we will lose 5,000 men taking Vicksburg, we might as well lose them here". It was heartless statement, cold and unfeeling. And it was also true.

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 April 29, 1863, to his wife Ellen, William T. Sherman privately expressed his misgivings about the Vicksburg campaign Ulysses S. Grant was just then launching. “My own opinion is that this whole plan of attack on Vicksburg will fail must fail, and the fault will be on us all of course,” he wrote.

McClernand, who outranked him and thus superseded him in command following Sherman’s defeat at Chickasaw Bayou in late December 1862. That replacement, Sherman later admitted, was “the severest test of my patriotism.”

“The Noises & clamor have produced their fruits. Even Grant is cowed & afraid of the newspapers,” Sherman wrote, suspecting machinations behind the outcry.

Should as the papers now intimate Grant be relieved & McClernand left in command, you may expect to hear of me at St. Louis, for I will not serve under McClernand. He is the impersonation of my Demon Spirit, not a shade of respect for truth, when falsehood is easier manufactured & fitted to his purpose: an overtowering ambition and utter ignorance of the first principles of war. I have in my possession his orders to do “certain things” which he would be ashamed of now. He knows I saw him cow at Shiloh. He knows he blundered in ignorance at the Post & came to me beseechingly, “Sherman what shall we do now?” And yet no sooner is the tempest past, and the pen in hand, his star is to be brightened and none so used to abuse, none so patient under it as Sherman. And therefore Glory at Sherman’s expense.

“I avoid McClernand, because I know he is envious & jealous of everybody who stands in his way,” Sherman told Ellen earlier in April. “He knows I appreciate him truly and therefore he would ruin me if he could.”.... “[H]e is a most deceitful man, taking all possible advantage and having no standard of truth & honor but the public clamor,”

“I think Grant will make a safe lodgment at Grand Gulf,” Sherman confided to Ellen, but the real trouble is and will be the maintenance of the army there. If the capture of Holly Springs [on December 20, 1862] made him leave the Tallahatchie, how much more precarious is his position now below Vicksburg with every pound of provision, forage and ammunition to float past the seven miles of batteries at Vicksburg or be hauled thirty-seven miles along a narrow boggy road?

a man “full of vain-glory and hypocrisy” and enamored by a “process of self-flattery,”




Enclosed is a list of casualties--36 killed, 78 wounded, 3 deserted — total, 124.

Major-General Maury arrived on the morning of the 30th and assumed command. The report of my future operations will be sent through him. Please find enclosed reports of Colonels WithersHigginsThomas and Morrison.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. D. LeeMajor-General C. S. A., commanding on YazooMajor J. G. Deveraux, A. A.-G., Second District, Departments Mississippi and E. La.

 It was Christmas Eve, 1862. A grand ball was being held at the William Balfour House in Vicksburg, Mississippi, for the Confederate officers of the garrison and the gentlemen and ladies of the town. The officers were dressed in their gray uniforms, decorated with gold braid and trim of buff, blue, red, or yellow, depending on their rank and branch of service. The belles, in their rich, gaily colored gowns, made the war seem far away. There were flashes of color as they made their way through the intricate steps of the Virginia Reel and the quadrilles. They danced and celebrated merrily, not aware of two telegraph operators who were watching the Mississippi River for enemy vessels on this cold and drizzly night.1 L. L. Daniel, a telegraph operator whose duty was to keep the Mississippi River under observation, manned an observation site at Point Lookout, Louisiana. At about 8:45 p.m., he sighted a Federal gunboat heading south on the river, the first of a fleet of Union gunboats and troop transports. Reaching his office just after midnight, Daniel hurriedly telegraphed the operator at DeSoto, across the river from Vicksburg. This operator was Philip H. Fall, who immediately crossed the river, his small boat tossed about by the waves. Soon thereafter, wet and mud-covered, Fall arrived at the ball and made his way through the dancers to Major General Martin Luther Smith, the acting commander of Vicksburg in Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemberton’s absence. Pemberton was at Grenada, Mississippi, facing off against Union Major General Ulysses S. Grant. Once given this warning, Smith made the announcement that “This ball is at an end; the enemy are down the river.”2 Smith sent Brigadier General Stephen Dill Lee with about five thousand men to defend the Walnut Hills region, north of Vicksburg,

leaving approximately sixteen hundred men to defend the city.3 Lee hurriedly set his men and many slaves to work preparing rifle pits and artillery parapets. They also cleared most of the willows and other trees to construct abatis in any place that was not defended by swamp or bayou. They left stumps that were three or four feet high and interlaced the branches they had cut, forming an almost impenetrable barrier. The branches, draped with Spanish moss, would later provide cover for the sharpshooters and skirmishers on both sides.4 Little did the Confederates know that the Union fleet was no longer steaming downstream; it was anchored at Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana, a few miles up-river from Vicksburg. The infantry force on board the transports was the Expeditionary Force, Army of the Tennessee, consisting of approximately thirty thousand Union soldiers commanded by Major General William Tecumseh Sherman. He detached the brigade led by Brigadier General Stephen Gano Burbridge of Brigadier General Andrew Jackson (A. J.) Smith’s division. Sherman ordered Burbridge to move inland and destroy part of the Vicksburg, Shreveport, & Texas (VS&T) Railroad near the Tensas River. Burbridge also burned a great deal of cotton, corn, and cloth. When the fleet moved south again, Sherman left A. J. Smith at Milliken’s Bend to follow when Burbridge returned.5 On Christmas Day, the Federal fleet moved down to the mouth of the Yazoo River. There, Sherman detached Brigadier General Morgan Lewis Smith with one of his brigades on the Louisiana side of the Mississippi to destroy more of the VS&T Railroad.6 Sherman was in no hurry as he moved down-river; perhaps he should have been. He had departed his headquarters at Memphis, Tennessee, on December 20, and stopped at Helena, Arkansas, to pick up Brigadier General Frederick Steele’s division. They moved leisurely down the river, stopping now and then to acquire firewood. They also stopped each night.7 Meanwhile, the commander of the Army of the Tennessee, Ulysses S. Grant, was north of Grenada, Mississippi, with forty thousand men, moving south against General Pemberton, who commanded the On December 21, Pemberton had ordered Brigadier General John C. Vaughn to take his brigade of East Tennesseans to reinforce the defenders of Vicksburg. On Christmas Eve, learning that the Federal fleet was at the mouth of the Yazoo River, Pemberton ordered Brigadier General John Gregg’s brigade to Vicksburg. The next day, he sent the 40th Alabama Regiment to report to Lee. Once these troops reached Vicksburg, there would be a little over thirteen thousand men to defend the town; the Confederates would still be outnumbered, but not by as much, and they held a strong position. Pemberton reached Vicksburg at noon on December 26 and assumed command of the city, while confirming Lee as commander of the troops defending the Walnut Hills.9 The Yazoo River/Chickasaw Bayou area north of Vicksburg was cut up by swamps, bayous, and lakes. Since describing this expanse is almost impossible, the reader should refer to the map accompanying this article. On December 26, under the cover of the gunboats that shelled the banks of the Yazoo River up to Snyder’s Mill, Sherman disembarked most of the Union troops at Johnson’s Plantation.10 The next day, he landed Steele’s division at the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. To get into position, the Federal forces first had to push the Confederate troops away from their forward points at Mrs. Lake’s plantation and Thompson Lake. Later in the day, Union Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter reported the action taken by the Navy: “We have had stirring times to-day, engaging the Yazoo batteries and taking up the torpedoes. The old war horse, Benton, had been much cut up, and the gallant, noble [Lieutenant Commander William] Gwin, I fear, mortally wounded. He was struck in the right breast with a large rifle shot, which tore off all the muscles of his right arm.”11 All the approaches were commanded by Confederate sharpshooters who manned the Chickasaw Bayou levee running along the bayou on its opposite bank, with a road immediately behind that led to Yazoo City. This levee and road formed a natural parapet. The road also offered a means of quickly shifting troops to reinforce the different sectors. Behind the levee was a strip of table land upon which were rifle pits and artillery batteries. Further behind the table land was a “high, abrupt range of hills [Walnut Hills] whose scarred sides were marked all the way up with rifle trenches, and the crowns of the principle hills presented heavy batteries.”12 On the morning of December 27, Brigadier General Francis (Frank) Preston Blair Jr.’s Union brigade was detached from Steele’s division. Steele was ordered to advance between Chickasaw Bayou and Thompson’s Lake with his other two brigades. Steele said: “While we were cutting the roads through the timber to the levee Admiral Porter called for troops to cross the river and disperse about 400 sharpshooters who were concealed on the west side of the river impeding the progress of the gunboats.” Steele sent the 17th Missouri.13 When the 17th Missouri returned, General Steele continued his forward movement. Steele stated, “Our progress was considerably retarded by the timber felled across the levee.” Soon, they came to deep water, which turned out to be Thompson’s Lake. They were on the wrong side of the lake; they should have been between the lake and the bayou. It was too late in the day to retrace their steps, so they bivouacked, with no fires.14 Charles Willison of the 76th Ohio told of an unexpected hazard: “Moving forward, our way was through a field overgrown with cockle burrs, a great thicket of them higher than our heads and crowned with the dry burrs which showered down on us at a touch. Midway in this my cap was knocked off and that instant my head was a mass of the prickly things which I had no time to stop and detach. I simply had to clap my cap on top.”15 Brigadier General David Stuart’s brigade followed Blair’s brigade until they came to an open field. Stuart was under the command of Morgan L. Smith, who ordered him to send a regiment to investigate some woods on the right of the open field. Stuart dispatched the 55th Illinois accompanied by the 58th Ohio from Blair’s brigade and described their advance: “They crossed a bayou near at hand on a fallen tree,”16 single-file. When they got to the woods, they ran into Confederate skirmishers. Stuart immediately crossed the remainder of his brigade, which drove the enemy skirmishers across Chickasaw Bayou. When the Union forces reached the bayou, they were met by a heavy volley and forced to take cover in the abatis, where they lay under severe gunfire throughout the night.17 The Northern division of Brigadier General George Washington Morgan advanced to the Lake house, where it found a heavy force of the enemy in a wooded area across Chickasaw Bayou. A two-hour battle ensued before the Confederates retreated. Night was coming on, so the men camped at the battle site.18 The next morning, December 28, Morgan L. Smith’s Union division found itself facing a narrow sand spit at an Indian mound that would provide a way across the bayou. The Confederates had thrown down abatis along the Federal side of the bayou and occupied the parapet behind the levee, with a system of rifle pits and batteries providing crossfire. Union forces would have to fight their way through these defenses before they reached the bluff. Smith investigated the crossing during the early morning fog of December 28. According to a member of the 55th Illinois, he “proceeded to the edge of the brush that fringed the slashed timber, took out his glass and began to look into the lifting fog to get a view across the bayou … Presently he put up his glass, calmly reined his horse to the rear and returned as he came . . . He had, while looking through his glass, been shot by a rebel sharp-shooter, the bullet striking him near the top of the hip bone and ranging across the back to the spine; yet such was his splendid nerve that the wound, almost mortal, did not cause a tremor of the voice. He fell from his horse when out of sight of his men, and was carried to the boats.” Stuart assumed leadership of the division but was placed under the control of A. J. Smith, who was more experienced.19 On Stuart’s right was A. J. Smith’s division. Smith placed Burbridge’s brigade next to Stuart, with orders to build rafts to cross his men over the bayou. A. J. Smith’s other brigade, commanded by Colonel William J. Landram, was to engage the enemy from the road that led to Vicksburg by moving skirmishers forward into the abatis.20 Steele’s division was moved to the west side of Thompson’s Lake to link up with General Morgan. Frank Blair’s brigade, although part of Steele’s division, was treated by General Morgan as an autonomous unit. Morgan ordered Blair to move his brigade forward to the left of General M. L. Smith. Colonel John B. Wyman of the 13th Illinois Infantry was killed around this time, “shot through the breast, from left to right, by a rifle-ball which was found lodged in the underclothing on the right side of his body,”21 and Lieutenant Colonel Adam B. Gorgas assumed command of the regiment. Sherman’s skirmishers and sharpshooters tried to force their way through the abatis. The fight settled down into a fire fight between the artillery and skirmishers on both sides. Some of the skirmishers covered their hats and uniforms with the Spanish moss they took from the abatis, making a natural camouflage.22 Captain Jacob T. Foster, commander of the 1st Wisconsin Light Artillery, got into a duel with an enemy battery. He described their time under fire: “Here the bursting of shells, the crashing of trees, the thunder of our own guns, and the showering of bullets seemed enough almost to drive us back, but bravely did our men stand their ground, and although many of them were knocked down, strange to say none were hurt, but several were severely shocked for a moment. Lieutenant Nutting had a shell to burst in the ground about 2 feet under him, raising him several feet into the air and completely stunning him for several minutes without otherwise injuring him.”23 That night, Stuart sent out a scouting party that discovered an old ford. He described the terrain: “The enemy had obstructed [the ford] by felling heavy trees which formed an impassable entanglement. On the opposite shore [of the bayou], the bank was near . . . 20 feet high and deeply underworn by the water.” There were Confederate rifle pits across the bayou, on the left of the ford, which commanded the crossing perfectly. There was also a battery opposite the ford. Stuart had the abatis cleared that night by a working party.24 Stuart was ordered by Sherman to advance skirmishers to keep the Confederate troops occupied. One of his regiments detailed for this purpose was the 55th Illinois. According to one of its members, “They were directed to scatter out among the logs and keep up an incessant fire at the top of the levee beyond.” The companies were sent out one company at a time. When it became F Company’s turn, “It was led forward by Captain Casper Schleich. With his arm outstretched for the purpose of directing one of his followers to a place of safety, apparently not thinking of his own peril, he was struck fair in the breast by a bullet, and with a gush of blood from his great heart he fell dead into the arms of his comrades.”25 The Federals attempted to build a pontoon bridge across one of the bayous on the morning of December 29.26 In the words of F. H. Mason of the 42nd Ohio Infantry, “every effort was made to lay the bridge, under a heavy fire from the enemy’s artillery and sharp-shooters, but the boats were heavy, the enemy’s shells sunk two of them, and the bridge would not span the bayou.”27 The rest of the Federals started the morning as the subjects of an artillery barrage against their entire line. Captain Foster of the 1st Wisconsin Light Artillery described the cannonade: “The cannonading was opened at 7:30 a.m. and was truly terrific to us. Shell after shell burst among us and in the air just in front, sending in our midst a hail-storm of bursting shell.”28 Around 10:30 a.m., the Union forces opened a cannonade on the Confederate lines, which lasted for an hour and a half, allowing the Federals time to arrange their forces into assault columns. Confederate Colonel Winchester Hall of the 26th Louisiana Infantry described the bombardment from the Confederate side: “A terrible storm of shot and shell now burst upon us, and in its fury it seemed as if no living thing about us could escape. When at its height I cried out at the highest pitch of my voice: ‘That’s the music!’” This simple statement seemed to calm his troops.29 When the cannonade was over, the Union troops were ordered to assault all along the line. However, most of the regiments on the flanks were not able to penetrate the abatis, so the main attack was on the center of the Confederate line. Blair’s brigade waded back to the east side of Chickasaw Bayou before the offensive. According to Lieutenant Simon T. Josselyn of the 13th Illinois, “General Blair rode along as we were about crossing a muddy bayou, and said: ‘I’ll see if you can stand mud and water as well as you can stand fire.”30 Blair formed his brigade in a wood between Thompson’s Lake and the bayou.31 When he had them formed in a double line, he ordered the men forward. Colonel John F. DeCourcy, of Morgan’s division, positioned his brigade along the abatis, in a double line of battle. Brigadier General John Milton Thayer of Steele’s division arrayed his Iowa brigade in a column with the 4th Iowa in the lead. They were to support DeCourcy’s brigade. Thayer went in person with the 4th Iowa and ordered each of the other regiments to follow the regiment in front of it. When the order to advance was given, DeCourcy’s two right regiments (22nd Kentucky and 42nd Ohio) “found themselves immediately engaged under a hot fire in the toils of a nearly impassable abatis of heavy timber.” John Harrington of the 22nd Kentucky Infantry wrote in a letter home: “One poor fellow received a ball full in the forehead who was right in front of me he turned over gave a rattling groan and expired.”32 DeCourcy’s two left regiments (54th Indiana and 16th Ohio) had an easier approach to the bayou and raced down the road in column formation. The rugged Westerners surged over a corduroy bridge that spanned the bayou and formed a line of battle in a belt of land that the soldiers dubbed the “Bloody Triangle.” They fought across the Triangle to the County Road at the base of the Chickasaw Bluff but were unable to advance farther.33 Between Blair’s formation and the enemy “was an entanglement formed by cutting down small cotton trees, leaving the trees entwined among the stumps. The bed of the bayou (a feeder stream of Chickasaw Bayou) was about 100 yards wide, quicksand, and about 15 feet wide, water 3 feet deep. The bank on the opposite side was steep and obstructed by abatis, crowned by a line of rifle pits.” Another line of rifle pits was behind the first.34 Blair led his troops through the abatis and across the stream into the “Bloody Triangle.” Albert H. Sibley of H Company, 13th Illinois said: “The front was bold and magnificent, and the battle maintained with courage and splendor – if such things can be called splendor, that take men’s lives.”35 Blair and his men fought their way past the two lines of rifle pits. Above the second line of rifle pits was a group of small willows and some of the Confederates took cover there. The 13th Illinois drove them out in a hand-to-hand fight.36 The brigade progressed to the levee in front of the county road, but were unable to advance farther. Blair stated that “Some reached the foot of these formidable works only to pour out their lives at their base.” His troops were falling fast around him.37 General Lee of the Confederate army stated that “As soon as they began to get close to the Confederate line they were literally mowed down by the fire of the infantry in their front and both flanks.”38 Troops from Louisiana captured four colors and 332 Union soldiers before the Federals retreated in confusion.39 Meanwhile, the 4th Iowa, of General Thayer’s Iowa brigade, had crossed the corduroy bridge over the bayou. According to Lurton Ingersoll, “They carried the first line of works, drove the rebels from their second line, and there remained under a terrible fire waiting for support.”40 When Thayer looked around for his backup regiments, he found that there were none. He re-crossed the bayou and found the second regiment in line, the 30th Iowa. Before it was able to fulfill Thayer’s orders, it had been ordered by General Steele to move off to the right to support General Morgan.41 Each of the other three regiments in line followed the 30th Iowa, according to orders.42 Thayer returned to the 4th Iowa, and walked the line, “absolutely shedding tears at sight of so many brave men falling around.”43 “It was nothing but slaughter for it to remain.” Thayer ordered the 4th back across the bayou.44 J. E. Gaskell of the 17th Louisiana described the Iowans’ fight from the Confederate side: “They were within good rifle range from the time they left the old field, and the slaughter was terrible. We rounded up many prisoners. Those who could get away did not stand upon the order of their going.”45 Colonel Hall of the 26th Louisiana said, “Under cover of shot and shell, the enemy advanced, with a force quite sufficient to carry our weak lines, for the men in the pits were in single file, and we had no reserve force. Artillery and infantry, on both sides, soon became hotly engaged. The enemy’s line continued to advance, although every weapon on our side was warm, and every man was doing his best. Some approached within fifty yards of our line, but it was their last assault.”46 Farther to the right, Colonel Giles A. Smith’s Federal brigade of Stuart’s division was directed to storm an Indian mound. The troops made it through the abatis, and two regiments were deployed behind the bank of the bayou as sharpshooters. One company of the 6th Missouri was ordered to cross and construct a road up the bank of the levee. When they got to the levee, the men decided that they would have to dig through the levee, and began to do so. While they were working, Smith discovered a narrow path leading up the levee about 100 yards to the left. It was wide enough to allow two men to walk abreast.47 Smith “immediately ordered the Sixth to cross, which they did in fine style under a heavy fire.” It formed under the levee and waited for the working party to finish cutting its way through. According to Sherman, “The men of the Sixth Missouri actually scooped out with their hands caves in the bank, which sheltered them against the fire of the enemy, who, right over their heads, held their muskets outside the parapet vertically, and fired down.” By now, it was getting dark. Smith deployed two more regiments as sharpshooters and ordered the 6th Missouri to retreat under cover of the darkness and covering fire of the sharpshooters. Even then, they had to retreat one man at a time.48 The 60th Tennessee of Vaughn’s brigade was on the extreme Confederate left. They were not attacked but were subjected to a heavy Union artillery barrage. R. L. Bachman of the 60th, with his regiment, “was ordered to move into the blockade of fallen timber . . . for protection. While obeying this order, a shell from the enemy’s battery fell into our company . . . It passed through one man, then exploded, mortally wounding five others. A fragment of the same shell tore the cover off of the haversack of another soldier and broke the bayonet in its scabbard hanging by his side.”49 Stephen D. Lee, whose horse was killed under him by a cannon shot, was seen everywhere on the Confederate line, especially where the fighting was heaviest. According to A. S. Abrams, “At last, a flank movement was made by our forces, sallying from the breastworks and attacking the enemy on his [left] flank, routing him . . . This coup de etat put an end to the battle, the enemy having been punished too severely to attempt another assault.”50 General Sherman concluded that he could not break the Confederate line “without being too crippled to act with any vigor afterward.” He described the end of the attack: “When the night of the 29th closed in we stood upon our original ground and had suffered a repulse.” It rained heavily that night. Willison of the 76th Ohio described what he went through: “Rain poured down in torrents all night and my rubber poncho, which I put up for shelter, did not save me from the thick, sticky, miry clay in which I had to wallow trying to get a little sleep.”51 Sherman visited Admiral David Dixon Porter that night and suggested that he would hold the present ground and give Porter ten thousand infantry. He wanted Porter to advance up the Yazoo as far as possible, near the battery on Drumgould’s Bluff, disembark, and attack the Confederate lines there. He assigned Steele’s division and Giles Smith’s brigade of Stuart’s division to board the transports for this effort. The attack was scheduled to take place at 4:00 a.m. on December 30, 1862. However, when it came time for the fleet to start up the river, “the admiral had found the fog so dense on the river that the boats could not move.”52 On December 31, Union General Morgan sent a flag of truce, asking for four hours to collect his wounded and bury the dead. The Confederate general granted the four hours, but there was no firing on either side for the rest of the day.53 Sherman and Porter decided to try on the night of January 1, 1863, for the surprise attack at Drumgould’s Bluff. Before the fleet moved, Sherman got a note from Porter: “Inasmuch as the moon does not set tonight until 5.25 the landing must be a daylight affair, which in my opinion, is too hazardous to try.” Sherman agreed, and the attack was called off.54 The men not on the transports were camped on low, swampy ground that would have been turned into a quagmire if it rained again. There were high water marks on the trees ten to twelve feet above the roots. Sherman could see “no good reason for remaining in so unenviable a place any longer.” He gave orders to embark his troops, and they were all on their transports by sunrise of January 2. He could hear trains coming and departing Vicksburg all the time and was sure that more Rebel reinforcements were arriving. There were rumors that Grant had fallen back from Grenada, so there was no chance that he would arrive to reinforce Sherman as planned.55 The Union forces did not board their transports without some response from the Confederates. General Lee reported that he: “With the 2nd Texas [Cavalry] and two Tennessee regiments [3rd and 30th], pursued the enemy . . . The 2nd Texas was deployed as skirmishers . . . and got close to the boats and opened fire on them, but the enemy had gotten aboard, and were moving off.”56 On January 3, the Union troops were back at Milliken’s Bend. Major General John Alexander McClernand met Sherman there. Outranking Sherman, he took over command. At Sherman’s suggestion, they moved up-river and captured Arkansas Post a week later, somewhat mitigating the disaster of Chickasaw Bayou, where they had suffered almost two thousand casualties in contrast to fewer than two hundred for the Confederates. Nevertheless, the Union military was not finished with Vicksburg with the conclusion of the Chickasaw Bayou Campaign. The Federals would return under General Ulysses S. Grant, and they would not stop until Vicksburg was theirs.  



First Division 

BG Andrew Jackson Smith

1st Brigade BG Stephen Gano Burbridge

16th Indiana: Col Thomas J. Lucas

60th Indiana: Col Richard Owen

67th Indiana: Col Frank Emerson 

83rd Ohio: Ltc William H. Baldwin

96th Ohio: Col Joseph W. Vance

23rd Wisconsin: Col Joseph J. Guppey

2nd Brigade  Col William J. Landram 

77th Illinois: Col David P. Grier 

97th Illinois: Col Friend S. Rutherford 

108th Illinois: Col John Warner 

131st Illinois: Col George W. Neeley 

89th Indiana: Col Charles D. Murray 

19th Kentucky: Ltc John Cowan 

48th Ohio: Ltc Job R. Parker

Second Division  BG Morgan Lewis Smith

1st Brigade Col Giles A. Smith 

113th Illinois: Col George B. Hoge 

116th Illinois: Col Nathan W. Tupper 

6th Missouri: Ltc James H. Blood 

8th Missouri: Ltc David C. Coleman 

1st Battalion, 13th U.S.: Maj Dudley Chase

Third Division      BG George Washington Morgan

1st Brigade Col Lionel A. Sheldon 

18th Illinois: Col John G. Fonda 

69th Indiana: Col Thomas Warren Bennett 

120th Ohio: Col Daniel French

2nd Brigade Col Daniel W. Lindsey 

49th Indiana: Col James Keigwin 

7th Kentucky: Ltc Joel W. Ridgell 

114th Ohio: Ltc Horatio B. Maynard

3rd Brigade Col John F. DeCourcy 

54th Indiana: Col Fielding Mansfield 

22nd Kentucky: Ltc George W. Monroe (w), Maj William J. Worthington 

16th Ohio: Ltc Philip Kershner (w/c

42nd Ohio: Ltc Don Albert Pardee

Fourth Division BG Frederick Steele

1st Brigade BG Francis Preston Blair, Jr. 

13th Illinois: Col John B. Wyman (k), Ltc Adam B. Gorgas 

29th Missouri: Col John S. Cavender 

30th Missouri: Ltc Otto Schadt 

31st Missouri: Col Thomas C. Fletcher (w/c), Ltc Samuel P. Simpson (w

32nd Missouri: Col Francis H. Manter 

58th Ohio: Ltc Peter Dister (k

4th Ohio Battery: Cpt Louis Hoffman 

Company C, 10th Missouri Cavalry: Lt Daniel W. Ballon

2nd Brigade BG Charles E. Hovey 

25th Iowa: Col George A. Stone 

31st Iowa: Col William Smyth 

3rd Missouri: Col Isaac F. Shepard 

12th Missouri: Col Hugo Wangelin 

17th Missouri: Col Francis Hassendeubel 

76th Ohio: Col Charles Robert Woods  

1st Missouri Horse Artillery: Cpt Clemens Landgraeber

3rd Brigade BG John Milton Thayer 

4th Iowa: Col James Alexander Williamson (w

9th Iowa: Ltc William H. Coyl 

26th Iowa: Col Milo Smith 

30th Iowa: Col Charles H. Abbott 

34th Iowa: Col George W. Clark 

1st Iowa Light Artillery: Cpt Henry H. Griffiths











He developed into a martinet and had occasional run-ins with both enlisted men and officers. One corporal tried to shoot him during the course of an argument. Pemberton once told his mother, after admitting that she was right in a certain matter: “I cannot always bear reproach though I deserve it.”  This trait, along with prolonged military service, followed him into the Civil War and kept him from developing close relationships with fellow officers and men he commanded.. Davis undoubtedly gave the assignment to Pemberton to show South Carolina complainers that he had faith in the Pennsylvanian. Davis later would say that Pemberton was the best man available for the job. This was not true, and future circumstances in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana would prove it. 


Petty and bitter his entire life, Jefferson Davis (above), was convinced of his own military genius. He preferred to play favorites, and promoted Pemberton as one of those. The big Yankee was quickly promoted up the ladder in the Confederate Army - a year from Colonel to General.  And maybe the real reason John Pemberton got the job of defending Vicksburg was that Davis was determined to give no opening to the man who would be Pemberton's immediate boss - Lieutenant General Joseph Johnson.


The face of the frustration with these failures became Georgian General John Stevens Bowen (above), who formally charged Van Dorn with failing to make a proper reconnaissance before the attack on Corinth, marching his troops in a hasty and disorderly manner, failing to press the attack sooner on the second day, and neglecting the wounded after the attack failed. Later a charge of drunkenness while on duty was even added.



But even though Pemberton journeyed to the new Army headquarters at Grenada, Mississippi, to talk with Van Dorn, the average soldiers and even the most people in Jackson remained unaware the new Lieutenant General was in charge. 

“was a knightly fellow to look at” ...

 

He was humiliated on Oct. 12, when Davis replaced him but required that he stay on as a subordinate to the new commander, John C. Pemberton. Van Dorn’s dismal position worsened after wide-ranging charges of personal and professional misconduct emerged. A subordinate claimed that Van Dorn “did utterly fail and neglect to discharge his duties” at Corinth. There were also persistent rumors of womanizing (he had fathered three illegitimate children in Texas before the war) and drunkenness. Van Dorn furiously demanded a court of inquiry, which after lengthy proceedings cleared him of all charges in November.

Van Dorn paid for a thousand copies of the court’s findings to be distributed across the South, but not all were convinced of his innocence. Mississippi was “dense with narratives of his negligence, whoring, and drunkenness,” Senator James Phelan wrote to President Davis in early December. Van Dorn’s reputation in his home state was so bad that “an acquittal by a court-martial of angels would not relieve him of the charge.”

Van Dorn wrote his own letter to Davis. In it he was both contrite and defiant. “I have never had intercourse with any woman … who was not alike accessible to others,” he claimed, addressing rumors of adultery. He was “unfortunately not a good Christian,” he admitted, and guilty of “indiscretions, thoughtlessness and folly — or pleasantries, as they may be called.” Nevertheless, he declared, “I am not a Seducer, nor a drunkard.” Van Dorn felt himself so abused by his fellow Mississippians that he requested a post elsewhere.

He was lucky Davis refused him. In early December, Lt. Col. John S. Griffith, who commanded a cavalry brigade under Van Dorn, suggested, in a letter to Pemberton, a raid into the Union rear, and asked that Van Dorn lead it. After hesitating, Pemberton agreed and put Van Dorn in charge of three cavalry brigades, totaling 3,500 men, who despite Van Dorn’s tarnished reputation roared in welcome when he joined them on Dec. 16.






in the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, Confederate President Jefferson Davis promoted Pemberton to the rank of lieutenant general and sent him west to command the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. From the beginning, Pemberton perceived his mission to be strictly the defense of his department, primarily the retention of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Accordingly, he pressed ahead with the construction of fortifications already underway, and directed that supplies be stockpiled in Vicksburg sufficient to maintain a force of 17,500 men for five months. As a department commander Pemberton saw his role to be that of a manager of resources, dispatching subordinate commanders to handle local threats while he remained at headquarters. Two organizational complications made Pemberton’s job more difficult. First, Pemberton’s department was itself part of the larger Department of the West, commanded by General Johnston. But Pemberton’s orders told him to report directly to the War Department, not through Johnston, thus muddling the chain of command. Secondly, the western boundary of Pemberton’s department was the Mississippi River itself. He had no authority over the troops on the far bank. It is an axiom of war that one should not place a unit boundary along a route that the enemy might use as an avenue of attack, because the seams between units are commonly the weakest points of a defensive line. In this case the seam was the Mississippi River itself. This boundary between Pemberton’s Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, to the east of the river, and the Department of the Trans-Mississippi, to the west, had already served as an enemy avenue of attack and would almost certainly be threatened again. Nor could Pemberton expect much help from the hard-pressed Confederates on the far side of the river. The governor of Arkansas, weary of seeing troops from the Trans-Mississippi go east, never to return, had already threatened to secede from the Confederacy if the government in Richmond failed to protect his state. Ultimately, Pemberton’s department would contain 43,000 troops organized into five divisions. The division commanders were General Smith, who had defended Vicksburg against Farragut’s incursion in 1862, Maj. Gens. John H. Forney, William W. Loring, and Carter L. Stevenson, and Brig. Gen. John S. Bowen. Four of the five were graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, the exception being Loring who had risen from the ranks to become a colonel in the prewar Army.

Ironically, Grant’s first deliberate offensive in the direction of Vicksburg took place well inland, far from the Mississippi River and Porter’s gunboats. Experience in the war so far had shown that the most economical way to eliminate a Confederate river fortress was to outflank it from the landward side rather than assaulting it directly. Accordingly, in November 1862, Grant began preparations for an advance from western Tennessee toward Jackson, Mississippi, which, if successful, would force the evacuation of Vicksburg, just as earlier offensives had outflanked Columbus, Kentucky, and Memphis, Tennessee. There was one major difference: whereas his earlier Meanwhile, another body of cavalry raiders led by Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest attacked the railroads deep in the Union rear. Grant had no other option but to break off his offensive and withdraw (


 The Court of Inquiry cleared Van Dorn of all charges but they gave the army to Pemberton, and reduced Earl Van Dorn to commander of the cavalry. 

Naval officer David Dixton Porter argued: “I do not suppose that so great a piece of folly was ever before committed’ as the appointment of McClernand

And this failure left the Confederacy still controlling a 450 mile stretch of the Mississippi River - 150 miles from the bluffs of Memphis south to the high ground around Vicksburg, then 80 miles of swamp south to the 80 foot high bluffs at Port Hudson, and then 25 more miles of swamp to the dry ground entrenchments outside of Baton Rouge. 


But Vicksburg did not surrender to Farragut's gunboats. And this failure left the Confederacy still controlling a 450 mile stretch of the Mississippi River - 150 miles from the bluffs of Memphis south to the high ground around Vicksburg, then 80 miles of swamp south to the 80 foot high bluffs at Port Hudson, and then 25 more miles of swamp to the dry ground entrenchments outside of Baton Rouge. 


 And this failure left the Confederacy still controlling a 450 mile stretch of the Mississippi River - 150 miles from the bluffs of Memphis south to the high ground around Vicksburg, then 80 miles of swamp south to the 80 foot high bluffs at Port Hudson, and then 25 more miles of swamp to the dry ground entrenchments outside of Baton Rouge. 

That narrow 150 mile waist and those two points of high ground, Vicksburg and Port Hudson, were now Richmond's only connections to the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy - Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas. So it was decided in Richmond, that Vicksburg must be turned into the Gibraltar of the Confederacy.

Vicksburg was important because, although there was no bridge across the Mississippi River south of northern Illinois, there was the Vicksburg, Shreveport and Texas railroad which ran a 5'6" wide track from the supply base at Monroe, Louisiana , 78 miles east to Desoto at the head of the peninsula opposite Vicksburg.  The line had only 6 locomotives and 67 cars, and because of its non-standard gauge and the lack of a bridge, all supplies had to be unloaded and transferred to barges, and then floated across the river to the Vicksburg docks. 

Once there all goods had to be reloaded on the Southern Railroad for shipment east through Jackson, Mississippi and beyond. It was a tenuous connection but it was a connection.  Cut the Southern Railroad by occupying Vicksburg (above) and or in central Mississippi, and all the cattle, cotton, pork and wheat, sugar and flax from the the Trans-Mississippi would be forced to smuggle across the Mississippi River. And that is what Confederate President Jefferson Davis meant when he said that Vicksburg must be held at all costs.


Capturing Jackson and cutting the Pearl River Bridge would not give the Federal government access to the interior of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas. Capturing Vicksburg (above) would. As Lincoln continued, "The war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pockets…It means hog and hominy without limit, fresh troops from all the states of the far South and a cotton country where they can raise the staple without interference.” I have never found a more cogent or accurate description of the strategic situation in the fall of 1862.
The guy President Davis chose to defend Vicksburg was 48 year old Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemberton (above).  During the Mexican - American War he had twice been promoted for bravery. But his later service showed he was a better bureaucrat than a battle field leader. He might have been a better general if his politically connected Philadelphia daddy had not helped his early  career so often.  
Petty and bitter his entire life, Jefferson Davis (above), was convinced of his own military genius. He preferred to play favorites, and promoted Pemberton as one of those. The big Yankee was quickly promoted up the ladder in the Confederate Army - a year from Colonel to General.  And maybe the real reason John Pemberton got the job of defending Vicksburg was that Davis was determined to give no opening to the man who would be Pemberton's immediate boss - Lieutenant General Joseph Johnson.

The Yankee campaign was officially began on Sunday, 2 November 1862, when 2 - star General Ulysses  Grant (above) took over as commander of the Department of Tennessee, with authority over every Federal soldier west of Nashville, and south to Port Hudson. 

Conventional military logic dictated that the simplest approach would be for Grant to advance 40,000 men from southern Tennessee toward Holly Springs in eastern Mississippi.  Repairing the Mississippi Central Railroad behind his army, Grant would then capture  Oxford, Grenada and finally the state capital of Jackson, Mississippi, and thus cut the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad, isolating Vicksburg sixty miles to the west.  Of course thing did not work out that way.

- 30 -
 

When Grant's campaign finally started in late November, it started with text book flanking maneuvers by Sherman's men of the rebel lines along first the Tallihatchie and then the Coldwater rivers, forcing Pemberton on 29 November, 1862 to give up first Holly Springs and then, on 4 December Oxford without a fight. The willingness of Pemberton to retreat until he saw an opening was worrying for Grant.

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While he rebuilt the railroad behind him, Grant stockpiled food for men and horses, ammunition, uniforms, shoes - for men and horses - at Holly Springs. But Grant felt inspired to use a larger flanking movement. He ordered Sherman to secretly load a division on the empty supply trains heading back to Memphis. Once there he was to collect all available troops, meaning the 2 fresh divisions which had just arrived in that city, and sail all 30,000 men down the Mississippi River to the mouth of Yazoo River, just above Vicksburg. It was risky. Once on the river, Sherman's men would be off the board, out of communication if anything went wrong. But if Sherman could seize high ground along the Yazoo beyond the Vicksburg defenses, Pemberton's 24,000 men would be forced out of their defenses and into the open, where they could be destroyed..

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The timing could not have been better for the rebels. Van Dorn left Grenada Mississippi on 18 December, leading 3,500 horsemen around the Federal right, which had just been stripped of troops. And 2 days later, on 20 December, Sherman's XV Corps sailed from the docks at Memphis, putting them temporally out Grant's reach. And that same day, Van Dorn's rebels came galloping into the middle of Holly Springs and burned $1.5 million of supplies, before heading back to Grenada. In that single devastating raid, U.S. Grant had lost his ability to maneuver. He had little choice but to retreat. Unless, by some miracle, Sherman was able to capture that high ground and scare Pemberton into retreating, instead.

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